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Abstract
We study in a dynamic framework how product innovation activities of a
firm are influenced by its production capacity investments for an established
product and vice versa. The firm initially has capacity to sell an established
product, and it also has the option to undertake an R&D project, which
upon completion allows the firm to introduce a new vertically and horizontally
differentiated product to the market, thereby extending its product range. The
breakthrough probability of detecting the new product depends on both the
value of the firm’s R&D stock and its current R&D investment. It is shown
that the initial production capacity for the established product influences the
intensity of R&D activities of the firm. In particular, there are constellations
such that for large initial production capacity for the established product the
firm never invests in R&D and the new product is never introduced. For small
initial capacity the firm keeps investing in R&D implying that eventually the
new product is always introduced. Finally, for an intermediate range of initial
capacity levels the firm initially invests in product R&D, but then reduces
these investments to zero. In this scenario the new product is introduced with
a positive probability, which is however substantially smaller than 1. From a
technical perspective this analysis gives the example of a new type of Skiba
threshold phenomenon in the framework of a multi-mode optimization model.
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1 Introduction
The overall aim of this paper is to develop and exploit a dynamic framework of analysis
that allows studying the optimal investment strategies of established incumbent firms
under consideration of the uncertainty about future changes in the market structure.
The considered changes in the market structure are due to changes in the range of
products offered on the market which are triggered by product innovations of incum-
bent firms. As the ability to introduce new products is typically based on innovation
effort of the innovating firm, such changes are endogenous results of firm strategies
and industry dynamics.
In particular, this paper studies the problem of a firm undertaking R&D activities
to come up with a new (vertically and horizontally) differentiated product and at the
same time adjusts the capacity for the established product. The main feature of our
setup is that the change in market structure induced by the new product introduction
is explicitly modeled and that the hazard rate of innovation is a function of both the
intensity of investment in R&D and the accumulated knowledge stock. This latter
feature distinguishes the present paper from Dawid et al. (2013a) where innovation
was considered as an exogenous stochastic process. In order to focus on the interplay
between the stochastic dynamic R&D process and the production capacity adjustments
we abstract in our setting from competition effects.
We develop a dynamic model, where an incumbent firm offers an established prod-
uct. At some ex-ante unknown point in time the range of products is enlarged, because
the firm obtains the option to introduce a new product, which is vertically and hori-
zontally differentiated from the existing product. This option results from successfully
finishing an R&D project, which requires continued R&D investments. The timing of
the breakthrough is stochastic and cannot be perfectly predicted. Capacities cannot
be (fully) transferred between the production of different products, and therefore the
introduction of the new product reduces the value of the existing capacity. The firm’s
objective is to maximize its total discounted profits by optimally selecting its invest-
ments in production capacities for the different products it offers and, before the new
product is introduced, by choosing its innovation effort.
The problem outlined above is of substantial real-world relevance since, as has been
shown e.g. in Chandy and Tellis (2000), a large fraction of product innovations has
been achieved by established incumbents. For such firms there are important feedback
effects between their strategies on established markets (like capacity investments) and
innovation strategies aiming at the introduction of new products that extend the prod-
uct range. The main contribution of this paper is to consider the effect of an expected
change in the market structure on investment behavior in the established market, as
well as the feedback between capacity investments for the established product and
innovation efforts, in a dynamic framework. In spite of the large literature on capacity
investments and innovation incentives a rigorous integrated analysis of these effects is
so far missing.
The considered market environment captures in a stylized way the dynamic emer-
gence of new ’submarkets’ in an established market and its effect for the established
product before and after the occurrence of the new product. Real world examples re-
sembling such a setting are numerous: In the TV industry major producers of standard
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CRT television sets have started the production of flatscreens around the year 2000.
Although the production processes for these two variants are based on very different
technologies, for many years firms offered both products simultaneously. A second
example along these lines is the (time-phased) introduction of hybrid cars by many
car manufacturers, which opened a new submarket in this industry co-existing with
the established ones. It should be noted that a common feature of these examples is
that the introduction of the new products becomes possible due to the availability of
a new technology, or more generally due to technological progress. In such situations
the capacity devoted to the established product typically can hardly be transferred to
the production of the new product.
The main research question to be addressed within the framework sketched above
is how the incentive to invest in innovative activities is influenced by the (current)
capacity for the established product. In particular, we explore two issues. First, we
examine under which circumstances old market capacity might have long lasting effects
in a sense that it prevents the firm from innovating at all. Second, we consider the
effect of old market capacity on the distribution of innovation time in cases where
the new product is developed. In the latter scenario we also characterize how the
investment in established product capacity is adjusted in light of the anticipation of a
future new product introduction.
Establishing the firm’s optimal investment strategies requires solving a two-mode
piecewise deterministic dynamic optimization problem, where the two modes corre-
spond to the pre-innovation and post-innovation phase. Our approach to solving the
model is to analytically characterize as much as possible the solution before using a
numerical method of collocation to complete the analysis. Furthermore, we employ
an innovative numerical method that allows us to delineate the basins of attraction of
two different long-run steady states emerging in our model. We show that the initial
values of old market capacity and knowledge stock determine whether the incumbent
firm eventually introduces the new product or not. There are constellations such that
for large initial production capacity for the established product the firm never invests
in R&D and the new product is never introduced, whereas for small initial capacity
the firm keeps investing in R&D as long as the innovation has not arrived. In this sce-
nario the new product is always introduced. Finally, for an intermediate range of the
production capacity the firm initially invests in product R&D, but then reduces these
investments to zero. In this scenario the new product is introduced with a positive
probability, which is however substantially smaller than 1.
Endogenizing the R&D activities of an incumbent gives rise to a number of new
insights. For instance, we show that there is a non-monotonic relationship between
the degree of horizontal differentiation of the new product and capacity accumulation
on the established market prior to innovation. If the new product is a close substitute
to the established one, then this does not only influence the degree of cannibalization
after the new product introduction, but the firm is also less willing to invest in R&D
during the innovation phase. This delays the expected arrival of the innovation, which
fosters investment of the firm in the established product. The interplay of these effects
gives rise to the non-monotonicity.
Our analysis is the first to establish a dependency of long run outcomes on ini-
tial conditions in a multi-mode framework. Compared to the established literature
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on Skiba phenomena in dynamic optimization problems (see e.g. Skiba (1978) or
Haunschmied et al. (2005)) our analysis adds the observation that there are initial
conditions such that each of the two (deterministic) long run steady states is reached
with positive probability. Our approach allows to characterize this set of initial con-
ditions and also the set of initial conditions for which there is only one possible long
run outcome.
Another contribution of our paper is to put a new perspective on the extensive
discussion on the link between firm size and innovativeness initiated by Schumpeter
(1934). Endogenizing R&D activities of an intertemporally maximizing incumbent
allows us to find that small firms with a sufficiently high knowledge stock are the
most innovative ones (cf. Dolfsma and Van der Velde (2014)). This is in accordance
with results obtained in Dawid et al. (2013b) in a static setting. Also Yin and
Zuscovitch (1998) obtain that small firms have stronger incentives to perform product
innovations, which extend their product range. They establish their results in a myopic
adjustment framework considering both product and process innovation. Our approach
differs in that we consider a fully dynamic model with capacity dynamics and a hazard
rate depending on knowledge stock. Furthermore, since we are carrying out a global
analysis, we are able to stress potential implications of firm size on long run innovation
outcomes.
A dynamic global analysis examining the effects of initial characteristics on inno-
vation paths of a firm has also been provided in Hinloopen et al. (2013). Employing
a framework based on Cellini and Lambertini (2009) they consider an intertemporally
optimizing monopolist, which at each point in time determines production quantity
and investment in cost reducing process innovations. In their analysis they allow for
scenarios where initial production costs are above the reservation price and show that
in such a setting it can be optimal for the firm to invest in process innovation before
entering the market with positive quantities. The size of the initial costs determines
whether the firm eventually enters the market and also the long run level of process
innovation effort. A crucial difference with our work is that in their paper R&D in-
vestments lead to immediate and known cost reductions, while in our framework an
R&D project takes time to complete where the breakthrough probability depends on
both current R&D investment and knowledge stock built up by earlier investment.
Moreover, whereas Hinloopen et al. (2013) are concerned with process innovation, we
concentrate on product innovation.
Analyzing the R&D strategies of multi-product firms is an important issue. Some
previous contributions in this area study this problem within a static framework (see
e.g. Lambertini (2003), Lin and Zhou (2013)), but recently also a dynamic perspective
has been adopted. Product innovation incentives for dynamically optimizing firms
have been studied by Lambertini and Mantovani (2009) with a focus on its interplay
with process innovation activities. Contrary to this contribution, we explicitly take
into account the stochastic nature of product R&D and the fact that new product
introduction induces discrete changes in the demand structure. Also our focus on
the relationship between firm size and innovativeness distinguishes our paper from
Lambertini and Mantovani (2009).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model and
details its assumptions. Section 3 is devoted to analyses of the long run economic
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behavior before and after innovation. The dynamic analysis that follows in section 4
presents an innovative numerical procedure for the characterization of Skiba curves
separating the basins of attraction in dynamic optimization problems and shows that
the initial stocks of the monopolist with respect to production capacity and knowledge
can have crucial and non-continuous effects on the firm’s innovation activities and the
overall probability that the new product is introduced. Subsequently, the effects of the
characteristics of the new product, that emerges after innovation, on the incentives
to innovate or to invest in the established product prior to innovation are examined.
Some concluding remarks are given in section 5.
2 The Model
We consider at the onset a firm, which produces an established product 1. In addition
the firm has the opportunity to undertake an R&D project with the aim to develop
a new differentiated product called product 2. The completion time T of the R&D
project is stochastic. More precisely, innovation arrives at a hazard rate λ, which is
a function of current knowledge stock, KR(t), as well as the current investment IR(t)
in R&D. Following Doraszelski (2003) we employ an additive form of the hazard rate
given by
λ(IR(t), KR(t)) = αIR(t) + βKψR(t) α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, ψ > 0. (1)
Between t = 0 and t = T only product 1 is sold on the market. After time T the
firm is able to produce both product 1 and product 2. In what follows we denote the
time before the innovation, i.e. t ∈ [0, T ) , as mode m1. The time after the innovation
is mode m2, which thus runs from time t = T onwards.
The firm has an initial production capacity K1(0) = Kini1 for the established prod-
uct and an initial knowledge stock KiniR . In modem1, the firm invests in capacity K1(t)
for product 1 and the knowledge stock KR(t). There are also two types of investments
in the second mode, namely investments in capacities K1(t) and K2(t) for products 1
and 2, respectively. The capital accumulation equations are standard:
K˙1(t) = I1(t)− δ1K1(t) δ1 ≥ 0, K1(0) = Kini1 , (2)
K˙2(t) = I2(t)− δ2K2(t) δ2 ≥ 0, K2(0) = 0, (3)
K˙R(t) = IR(t)− δRKR(t) δR ≥ 0, KR(0) = KiniR . (4)
The depreciation rates of capital δ1 and δ2 are assume to be strictly positive. As for
δR > 0, it represents organizational forgetting (see Doraszelski (2003) and references
therein).
We allow the firm to intentionally scrap production capacities (i.e. I1, I2 ∈ IR) but
make the sensible assumption that knowledge investments are non-negative, i.e.
IR(t) ≥ 0 ∀t ≥ 0. (5)
An important assumption of the model is that the firm cannot invest in production
capacity of the second product before the product has been introduced to the market,
which implies that I2(t) = 0 in mode m1. Furthermore, all stocks have to be non-
negative:
Ki(t) ≥ 0 ∀t ≥ 0 i = 1, 2, R. (6)
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Concerning demand we rely on a standard linear model, where, following the liter-
ature on capital accumulation games (e.g. Dockner et al. (2000)), it is assumed that
production capacities for both products are fully exploited. Prices are thus given by
the linear inverse demand system
p1(t) = 1−K1(t)− ηK2(t), (7)
p2(t) = 1 + θ − ηK1(t)−K2(t). (8)
The parameter η (0 < η < 1) determines the degree of horizontal differentiation,
whereas the parameter θ determines the degree of vertical differentiation. By setting
θ > 0 one imposes that product 2 is of higher quality than product 1.
Investment costs are assumed to be linear quadratic for all stocks:
Ci(Ii(t)) = µiIi(t) +
1
2γiIi(t)
2 i = 1, 2, R., (9)
where the parameters µi and γi, i = 1, 2, R are positive.
Characterizing the firm’s optimal strategy boils down to solving a piecewise de-
terministic optimal control problem. The dynamics is deterministic in each mode of
the problem, however there is a stochastic transition between the modes. The profit
maximizing firm faces the following optimization problem:
maxI1,I2,IRJ = EPm
{∫ ∞
0
e−rt [(1−K1 − ηK2)K1 + (1 + θ − ηK1 −K2)K2
−µ1I1 − γ12 I
2
1 − µ2I2 −
γ2
2 I
2
2 − µRIR −
γR
2 I
2
R
]
dt
∣∣∣∣
m(0) = m1, K1(0) = Kini1 , K2(0) = 0, KR(0) = KiniR
}
, (10)
subject to the state and mode dynamics:
K˙i(t) = Ii(t)− δiKi(t), i ∈ {1, 2, R}, (11)
Ki(t) ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, 2}, (12)
IR (t) ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 0, (13)
I2(t) = 0, for all t s.t. m(t) = m1, (14)
lim
∆→0
1
∆IP {m(t+ ∆) = m2 | m(t) = m1} = αIR(t) + βK
ψ
R(t). (15)
It should be noted that the constraint IR ≥ 0 implies a non-negative KR, such that
no non-negativity constraint on KR is needed.
3 Analysis
We analyze the problem backwards, i.e. in the first section the situation after the
firm has innovated is examined. The second section considers the situation before the
breakthrough in the innovation process has taken place.
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3.1 Firm Investments after Product Innovation
In mode m2 the firm faces a standard capital accumulation problem with two capital
stocks and adjustment costs. Straightforward calculations show that there is at most
one interior steady state for the problem given by
Kss1 =
(1− (r + δ1)µ1)(2 + (r + δ2)γ2δ2)− 2η(1 + θ − (r + δ2)µ2)
(δ2γ2(r + δ2) + 2)(δ1γ1(r + δ1) + 2)− 4η2
Kss2 =
(1 + θ − (r + δ2)µ2)(2 + (r + δ1)γ1δ1)− 2η(1− (r + δ1)µ1)
(δ2γ2(r + δ2) + 2)(δ1γ1(r + δ1) + 2)− 4η2
In what follows we assume that parameters are such that KSS1 > 0, KSS2 > 0.
Furthermore, it is easy to see that under our assumptions the unique steady-state is
(globally) asymptotically stable under the optimal investment pattern (see Appendix
A.1). The following proposition characterizes the value function for mode m2.
Proposition 1. In mode m2, the value function of the firm has the form
V(m2) = aK21 + bK1 + dK1K2 + eK22 + fK2 + g, (16)
where a, b, d, e, f, g satisfy the nonlinear system:
ra = 2
γ1
a2 + 12γ2d
2 − 2aδ1 − 1
re = 2
γ2
e2 + 12γ1d
2 − 2eδ2 − 1
rd = 2
γ1
ad+ 2
γ2
ed− d(δ1 + δ2)− 2η
rb = 2
γ1
a(b− µ1) + 1γ2d(f − µ2)− δ1b+ 1
rf = 2
γ2
e(f − µ2) + 1γ1d(b− µ1)− δ2f + θ + 1
rg = 12γ1 b
2 + 12γ2f
2 − µ1
γ1
b− µ2
γ2
f + 12γ1µ
2
1 + 12γ2µ
2
2.
(17)
The optimal investment functions are given by
I∗1,(m2)(K1, K2) =
1
γ1
(b− µ1 + 2aK1 + dK2)
I∗2,(m2)(K1, K2) =
1
γ2
(f − µ2 + dK1 + 2eK2) .
Proof. See Appendix A.2
The system of nonlinear equations (17) has been numerically solved to determine
the sextuple (a, b, d, e, f, g) for each constellation of parameters. Although in general
(17) can have multiple solutions, the transversality condition lim
t→+∞e
−rtV(m2)(t) = 0 al-
lows to select a unique sextuple of coefficients characterizing the actual value function.
This is in accordance with standard results (see Jun and Vives (2004)) implying that
capital accumulation problems like the one here in mode m2, have at most one interior
stable steady state.
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3.2 Firm Investments Prior to Product Innovation
Having characterized optimal behavior in mode m2 we now move to the analysis of
investment prior to the innovation. In mode m1 the objective function (10) can be
rewritten as a two-stage problem where T is the stochastic switching time from m1 to
m2 :
max
I1,IR
J = E
{∫ T
0
e−rt
[
K1(1−K1)− µ1I1 − γ12 I
2
1 − µRIR −
γR
2 I
2
R
]
dt+ e−rTV(m2)(K1(T ), 0)
}
,
subject to (11)-(15). In a slight abuse of notation we denote fixed points of the state
dynamics in mode m1 under optimal investment as mode-1 steady states in spite of the
fact that there might be a positive probability that the system moves from mode m1
to m2 in finite time. In order to characterize the mode-1 steady states we employ the
maximum principle. In particular, we follow Haurie and VanDelft (1991) in introducing
an auxiliary state variable z (which can be interpreted as the accumulated hazard rate)
with state dynamics
z˙(t) = αIR(t) + βKψR(t),
and z(0) = 0. After some transformation related to the auxiliary variable z the
following Hamiltonian can be formulated for the problem (see Appendix A.3):
H(K1, KR, I1, IR, u1, uR, uz) = e−z
[
K1(1−K1)− µ1I1 − 12γ1I
2
1 − µRIR −
1
2γRI
2
R
+u1(I1 − δ1K1) + uR(IR − δRKR) + (αIR + βKψR)V(m2)(K1, 0) + uz(αIR + βKψR)
]
,
where u1 and uR are the co-state variables (after an appropriate transformation) asso-
ciated with the dynamic constraints on K1 and KR, respectively, and uz is the co-state
associated with the auxiliary variable z. In this notation the transformed co-states u1
and uR are defined by ui = u˜iez, i ∈ {1, R}, where u˜i defines the standard co-state
corresponding to the state variable i. To get an intuitive understanding of the ratio-
nale behind this transformation, it should be noticed that the standard co-states u˜i
represent the (expected) marginal contribution of the corresponding state variable to
the objective in mode m1. This marginal contribution at a given time t is only realized
if the mode is indeed m1, which implies that the standard co-state would decrease over
time even if the states stay constant. To control for this, the transformed co-states
represent the marginal contribution conditional to the situation that mode m1 still
prevails at the corresponding time. Since the probability that mode m1 prevails at t is
given by e−z(t), the standard co-states have to be divided by e−z(t)to obtain this con-
ditional value. The transformed co-states obtained in this way no longer change over
time in a steady-state of mode m1. To account for the state and control constraints,
let us form the Lagrangian L:
L(K1, KR, I1, IR, u1, uR, uz, ωK1 , ωIR) = e−z
[
K1(1−K1)− µ1I1 − 12γ1I
2
1 − µRIR −
1
2γRI
2
R
+ u1(I1 − δ1K1) + uR(IR − δRKR) + (αIR + βKψR)V(m2)(K1, 0) + uz(αIR + βKψR)
+ ωK1K1 + ωIRIR
]
, (18)
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where ωK1 and ωIR are the (transformed) Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with the
constraints on K1 and IR. Maximizing the Lagrangian yields the optimal controls
IR =
uR − µR + α(V(m2)(K1, 0) + uz) + ωIR
γR
, (19)
I1 =
u1 − µ1
γ1
, (20)
where the trajectories of the co-states have to satisfy the following co-state equations
(see Appendix A.3 for a derivation):
u˙1 = (r + δ1 + αIR + βKψR)u1 − (1− 2K1)− (αIR + βKψR)
(
∂V(m2)(K1, 0)
∂K1
)
− ωK1 ,
(21)
u˙R = (r + δR + αIR + βKψR)uR − βψKψ−1R (V(m2)(K1, 0) + uq), (22)
u˙z = (r + αIR + βKψR)uz +K1(1−K1)− µ1I1 −
1
2γ1I
2
1 ,
− µRIR − 12γRI
2
R + (αIR + βK
ψ
R)V(m2)(K1, 0), (23)
and the transversality conditions
lim
t→∞ e
−rtu1K1 = 0,
lim
t→∞ e
−rtuRKR = 0.
Furthermore, the multipliers have to satisfy the complementary slackness conditions
ωK1 ≥ 0, ωK1K1 = 0, (24)
ωIR ≥ 0, ωIRIR = 0.
A mode-1 steady state is characterized by the condition that the time derivatives of all
states and co-states except for z are zero. It should be noted that since the auxiliary
variable expresses the accumulated hazard rate, it keeps increasing also if both states
K1, KR have reached mode-1 steady state values, provided that the corresponding
steady state value of KR is positive. Based on these considerations it is straightforward
to see that a mode-1 steady state satisfies
0 =I1 − δ1K1,
0 =IR − δRKR,
0 =1− 2K1 + (αIR + βKψR)
∂V(m2)(K1, 0)
∂K1
− (r + αIR + βKψR + δ1)u1 + ωK1 ,
0 =(r + αIR + βKψR + δR)uR − βψKψ−1R
(
V(m2)(K1, 0) + uz
)
, (25)
0 =K1(1−K1)− µ1I1 − 12γ1I
2
1 − µRIR −
1
2γRI
2
R
+ (αIR + βKψR)V(m2)(K1, 0) + (r + αIR + βK
ψ
R)uz,
IR =
1
γR
(uR − µR + α
(
V(m2)(K1, 0) + uz
)
+ ωIR),
I1 =
1
γ1
(u1 − µ1),
9
together with (24). All vectors (K∗1 , K∗R, I∗1 , I∗R, u∗1, u∗R, u∗z, ω∗K1 , ω∗IR) satisfying this sys-
tem of equations are candidates for (locally asymptotically stable) steady states under
the optimal policy provided that the transversality conditions hold as well. For an
interior fixed point of the state-costate system (2), (4), (21), (22), (23), which implies
ω∗K1 = ω∗IR = 0, standard arguments establish that transversality is satisfied if and
only if the Jacobian of the state-costate system at the steady state has at least two
eigenvalues with negative real parts.
Based on these considerations we can establish the following conditions to be sat-
isfied by a candidate for an interior steady state under the optimal policy.
Proposition 2. Let (K∗1 , K∗R, I∗1 , I∗R, u∗1, u∗R, u∗z) be an interior fixed point of the state-
costate dynamics in mode m1. Then
(a) The eigenvalues of the Jacobian are given by
ξ1,2,3,4 =
r + λ∗
2 ±
1
2
√
2M + (r + λ∗)2 ± 2
√
M2 − 4Q,
ξ5 = r + λ∗,
where
M = α2 1
γ1
1
γR
(u∗1 − (2aK∗1 + b))2 −
1
γR
(r + λ∗ + δR)u∗R
(
(V ∗ + u∗z)
−1 + (K∗R)−1(1− ψ)
)
− 1
γ1
(2− 2aλ∗))− (r + λ∗)(δ1 + δR)− δ21 − δ2R −
α
γR
u∗R(r + λ∗ + 2δR)− βψ
u∗R
γR
(K∗R)ψ−1,
Q = − 1
γ1
1
γR
(u∗1 − (2aK∗1 + b))2(βψ(K∗R)ψ−1 + αδR + (r + λ∗)α)(βψ(K∗R)ψ−1 + αδR)
+
[
δ1(r + λ∗ + δ1) +
1
γ1
(2− 2aλ∗)
] [
1
γR
(r + λ∗ + δR)u∗R(u∗R (V ∗ + uz)
−1
+(K∗R)−1(1− ψ)) + ((r + λ∗ + δR)δR +
1
γR
uR(βψ(K∗R)ψ−1 + (r + λ∗)α + 2αδR))
]
,
where V ∗ = V(m2)(K1, 0) and λ∗ = αδRK∗R + β(K∗R)2.
(b) The Jacobian has at least two eigenvalues with negative real part if and only if
M < 0, (26)
and
0 < Q ≤ M
2
4 . (27)
If at least one of the two inequalities is violated, (K∗1 , K∗R) is not a candidate for
being a steady state under the optimal policy.
Proof. See Appendix A.4
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In what follows we will consider numerical examples to illustrate our findings and
determine the optimal investment paths. The default parameter setting for this pur-
pose is
α = 1, β = 0.1, ψ = 2, µ1 = 0.2, µ2 = 0.4, µR = 1.029, γ1 = γ2 = 0.15,
γR = 0.02, δ1 = δ2 = 0.1, δR = 0.3, η = 0.9, θ = 0.1, r = 0.04,
(28)
but we will also explore robustness of our findings with respect to parameter changes,
in particular for those parameters determining the degree of horizontal and vertical
differentiation. Whereas several parameter values, like the discount rate and deprecia-
tion rate are standard values, some other choices should be motivated. In our default
scenario we assume that the hazard rate can be significantly influenced by current
investment, even if the specific knowledge stock of the firm is not large. This is re-
flected by α = 1 and β = 0.1. Such a scenario corresponds to what is referred to a
’science-based industry’ in the literature on industry evolution (see Nelson and Winter
(1982)), i.e. an industry where breakthroughs are mainly based on publicly available
knowledge rather than on accumulated firm-specific knowledge. In the opposite case,
i.e. the hazard rate mainly depends on the knowledge stock, we speak of a ’cumula-
tive industry’. This would occur when the value of α is close or even equal to zero,
whereas β has a significantly positive value. Choosing ψ = 2 implies that the haz-
ard rate is a convex function of the knowledge stock, which captures the empirical
observation of economies of scale in innovation processes. Furthermore, by setting
µ2 = 0.4 > µ1 = 0.2, it is assumed that capacity buildup is more expensive for a newly
introduced product than for the well established one. Since the focus of the analysis
lies on the interplay between the established and the (anticipated) new product, we
are considering a situation where the new product is a relatively close substitute to the
established one (η = 0.9) and vertically differentiated (θ = 0.1). Finally, it is assumed
that knowledge depreciates faster than physical capital (δR > δ1 = δ2). The values
of the parameters determining the costs of knowledge investment (µR, γR) are crucial
in determining whether positive R&D investment occurs and whether a unique steady
state or several fixed points occur in mode m1.
Straightforward calculations show that under this parameter setting the system
(25) has three solutions given by
K∗,11 = 0.477, K∗,1R = 0.781, u
∗,1
1 = 0.207, u∗,1R = 0.204, u∗,1z = −6.079
K∗,21 = 0.484, K∗,2R = 0.171, u
∗,2
1 = 0.207, u∗,2r = 0.082, u∗,2z = −5.961
K∗,31 = 0.485, K∗,3R = 0, u
∗,3
1 = 0.207, u∗,3R = 0, u∗,3z = −6.
The first two of these steady states are interior ones, which means that Proposition
2 can be applied to determine whether they are candidates for being a steady state
under the optimal policy. Calculating M and Q for these two steady states shows
that only the first one can be a steady state under optimal investment1. In this steady
state there is a strictly positive hazard rate, which implies that for any initial condition
1The values of M and Q are given by M = −17.99, Q = 65.54 for the first steady state, which
implies that all conditions of Proposition 2 are satisfied, whereas for the second fixed point we
obtain M = −6.31, Q = −84.14 implying that the condition Q > 0 is violated.
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where the optimal path leads towards (K∗,11 , K∗,1R ) the new product will be introduced
with probability 1 and therefore mode m2 will prevail in the long run. On the other
hand, also the third fixed point can serve as a steady state under the optimal policy. In
this case the hazard rate is zero in the long run, i.e. if a firm is in this steady state the
probability of future innovation is zero. Based on the (local) method of the maximum
principle, for a given initial situation it cannot be determined whether the firm under
its optimal policy will converge either to the first or the third fixed point. Therefore,
we rely on (numerical) dynamic programming methods to characterize the optimal
investment paths of the firm and their implications for the probability of innovation.
4 Dynamics
After having explained the numerical procedure applied to solve the model in section
4.1, the resulting investment behavior is presented in section 4.2. Section 4.3 includes
a comparative statics analysis regarding the key parameters of our model.
4.1 The Numerical Procedure
We employ a combination of a collocation method using Chebychev polynomials and
homotopy to obtain an approximation of the value function of the problem and the
optimal investment strategies in mode m1. In particular, these methods are used to
obtain (approximate) solutions to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for
the problem in mode m1, which is given by
rV(m1) = max
I1, IR
[
K1(1−K1)− µ1I1 − 12γ1I1
2 + ∂V(m1)
∂K1
(I1 − δ1K1) − µRIR − 12γRIR
2
+ ∂V(m1)
∂KR
(IR − δRKR) +(αIR + βKψR)(V(m2)(K1, 0)− V(m1)(K1, KR))
]
. (29)
The last term on the right hand side of the HJB-equation has to be added because
this is a piece-wise deterministic problem and it captures the effect of the future jump
to mode m2 on the value function in mode m1 (see e.g. Dockner et al. (2000)). From
the HJB-equation optimal investment levels can be derived:
I∗1,(m1)(K1, KR) =
1
γ1
(
∂V(m1)
∂K1
− µ1
)
I∗R,(m1)(K1, KR) =
1
γR
(
∂V(m1)
∂KR
− µR + α(V(m2)(K1, 0)− V(m1))
)
, (30)
and the Bellman equation can be rewritten as
(r+αI∗R + βK
ψ
R)V(m1)−
∂V(m1)
∂K1
(I∗1 − δ1K1)−
∂V(m1)
∂KR
(I∗R− δRKR) = F (K1, KR, I∗1 , I∗R),
(31)
with
F (K1, KR, I∗1 , I∗R) = K1(1−K1)− µ1I∗1 − 12γ1I∗21 − µRI∗R − 12γRI∗2R
+(αI∗R + βK
ψ
R)V(m2)(K1, 0).
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Since no closed form solutions for this non-linear partial differential equation are avail-
able, we numerically approximate the solution by polynomial approximations of V(m1).
To this end we generate a set of n1 Chebychev nodes NK1 in [0, K¯1] and a set of nR
Chebychev nodes NKR in the interval [0, K¯R] for appropriately chosen values of K¯1
and K¯R (see e.g. Judd (1998) for the definition of Chebychev nodes and Chebychev
polynomials). We further define the set of interpolation nodes in the state space X as
N = {(K1, KR)|K1 ∈ NK1 , KR ∈ NKR}.
Note that the cardinality of N is n1 nR. Our goal is to calculate a polynomial approx-
imation of V(m1), which (approximately) satisfies (31) on the set of interpolation nodes
N . It is well known that the choice of Chebychev interpolation nodes avoids large oscil-
lations of the interpolating polynomial between the interpolation nodes (as could occur
e.g. for equi-distant nodes) and implies that the interpolating polynomials approxi-
mately solve the HJB equations on the entire state space. The set of basis functions for
the polynomial approximation is determined as B = {Bj,k, j = 1, .., n1, k = 1, .., nR}
with
Bj,k(K1, KR) = Tj−1
(
−1 + 2K1
K¯1
)
Tk−1
(
−1 + 2KR
K¯R
)
,
where Tj(x) denotes the j-the Chebychev polynomial. Since Chebychev polynomials
are defined on [−1, 1], the state variables have to be transformed accordingly.
The value function is approximated by
V(m1)(K1, KR) ≈ Vˆ (K1, KR) =
n1∑
j=1
nR∑
k=1
Cj,kBj,k(K1, KR), (K1, KR) ∈ X, (32)
where C = {Cj,k} with j = 1, · · · , n1, k = 1, · · · , nR is the set of n1nR coefficients
to be determined. To calculate these coefficients we set up a system of non-linear
equations derived from the condition that Vˆ(m1) satisfies the HJB equation (31) on
the set of interpolation nodes N . This system consists of n1nR equations with n1nR
unknowns (i.e. the coefficients Cj,k). We denote this system by G(C) = 0, where G is
a mapping IRn1nR → IRn1nR . It is solved by a recursive algorithm, where based on an
initial guess C˜0 = {C0j,k, j = 1, .., n1, k = 1, .., nR} of the coefficients in iteration l ≥ 1
the coefficients C˜ l−1 are used to calculate approximations of the value functions and
their partial derivatives at each node in N . These approximations are inserted for all
terms that occur in (31) where the value function or its derivatives appear in a non-
linear form. Inserting the approximation (32) with C replaced by C˜ l for all terms in
(31), where the value function and its derivatives occur in a linear way, yields a linear
system of equations for the coefficients C˜ l, which even for large values of n1nR can
be solved efficiently using standard methods as long as the coefficient matrix is well
conditioned. The solution of this linear system gives the new set of coefficient values
C˜ l. To complete the iteration, the new approximations of the value functions and their
derivatives are inserted into all (including the non-linear) corresponding terms in (31)
and the resulting absolute value of the left hand side of this equation relative to the
corresponding value function is determined for all nodes in N . If the maximum of this
relative error is below a given threshold  the algorithm is stopped, we set C = C˜ l
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and the current approximation of the value function is used to calculate the optimal
investment functions.
Unfortunately, no general conditions can be given that guarantee the existence of a
stable fixed point of the described algorithm, which corresponds to the (approximate)
solution of the HJB-equation. Also, starting with an appropriate initial guess for
the coefficients is often crucial for convergence to a meaningful fixed point, even if
there exists such a stable fixed point. Furthermore, the described method faces a
fundamental problem if the optimal control has jumps in the considered state space.
The value function exhibits a kink along the manifold where the optimal control jumps
(i.e. although the value function is everywhere continuous it is not differentiable at
points where the control jumps) and such kinks cannot be captured by the polynomial
approximation used in the collocation method, which by definition is smooth on the
entire considered state space. In particular, the optimal control derived from the
polynomial approximation of the value function must always be continuous on the
entire state space.
In order to deal with this problem, a combination of the collocation method de-
scribed above and a homotopy method is used to generate two ’local value functions’.
These local value functions provide for different initial states the maximal discounted
payoff among all paths converging to a given steady state candidate. The actual value
function is then given by the upper envelope of these two local value functions. If
the two intersect in the considered state space, then indeed both steady states are
locally stable fixed points under the optimal policy and the boundary between the
basins of attraction of the two fixed points is given by the manifold where the two
local value functions intersect. Along this manifold, which in the literature is referred
to as Skiba-curve or DNS-curve (see Haunschmied et al. (2005)) the optimal control
then typically is discontinuous.
In order to obtain the local value function around the fixed point with positive
knowledge stock the collocation method is applied to a parameter setting, where, de-
viating from (28), the cost of R&D investment is reduced to µR = 0.7. For this setting
all investments are strictly positive on the relevant state space and the collocation
method yields a very good approximation of the value function. For all initial states
the optimal trajectories converge to the fixed point with positive knowledge stock. Us-
ing this solution as a starting point, a homotopy method is used to gradually increase
the parameter µR from µR = 0.7 to the desired value of µR = 1.029 adjusting the
coefficient vector C according to
∂C
∂µR
= −[G′(C)]−1∂G(C)
∂µR
.
We denote the obtained approximation of the value function for µR = 1.029 by Vˆ l(m1),
where the superscript l indicates that it was obtained by approaching the target value
of µR from below. Since the homotopy method only takes into account the local
marginal changes in the optimal investment policy as the parameter µR is increased,
we conclude that Vˆ l(m1)(K1, KR) provides an accurate approximation of the actual value
function only for those states (K1, KR) where no jump in the optimal policy occurs if
µR is increased from 0.7 to 1.029. Put differently, Vˆ l(m1)(K1, KR) provides an accurate
approximation of the actual value function for all states where the optimal trajectory
14
converges to the positive knowledge steady state2.
The local value function for the fixed point with KR = 0 is obtained analogously.
The collocation method is applied for µR = 1.1, which is a parameter value where
the optimal investment is zero on the entire considered state space. Hence for this
parameter setting all optimal trajectories converge to the steady state with a knowledge
stock of zero. Then, again using homotopy, the effect of decreasing the parameter
µR from 1.1 to 1.029 is calculated. The resulting approximation of the local value
function is denoted by Vˆ h(m1). By the same arguments as above Vˆ
h
(m1)(K1, KR) provides
an accurate approximation of the actual value function for all states where the optimal
trajectory converges to the steady state with KR = 0.
The actual approximation of the value function is then given by V(m1)(K1, KR) =
max[Vˆ l(m1)(K1, KR), Vˆ
h
(m1)(K1, KR)] and the investment functions are obtained from
(30) using this approximation of the value function. The intersection line between
Vˆ l(m1) and Vˆ
h
(m1) determines the Skiba curve where optimal controls jump.
4.2 Optimal Dynamics of Investment and Innovation
Using our default parameter setting and applying the numerical procedure described
in the previous section3, we realize that indeed both candidates for a stable steady
state have a basin of attraction of positive size. The value function of the problem
for mode m1 is depicted in Figure 1, where the bold black line indicates the Skiba
curve which separates the basins of attraction of the two steady states. As expected
the value function increases as the knowledge stock is increased, whereas, due to our
assumptions that capacities are always fully used an increase of the capacity for the
established product can have negative effects if the capacity is already substantially
above the steady state output levels.
4.2.1 Optimal Investment Functions
The corresponding investment functions are given in Figure 2. Panel (a) shows how
investment in established production capacity depends on the current established prod-
uct capacity level and on knowledge. It shows a strong negative dependence of this
investment on the established product capital stock. This is understandable because
a higher established product capacity reduces the output price for the established
product (note that capacity is fully used so higher capacity means higher sales, which
reduces price), so that profitability of established product investment goes down with
this capacity. Also, it can be seen that the investment function I1 does not display
any noticeable discontinuity along the Skiba curve.
2It should be noted that the approximated value function generated by this method does not
exactly satisfy the HJB equation, but that there is always a remaining error. For a ’local value
function’ constructed in the way above this error remains small in the part of the state space close
to the considered stable steady state, whereas it becomes relatively large in the parts of the state
space where the optimal trajectory converges to an alternative steady state.
3The parameters in the numerical method were chosen as K¯1 = 1, K¯R = 1.2 and n1 = nR = 8.
For reasons of clarity in most figures we only depict parts of this considered state space. Also, in
the calculations concerning the welfare analysis in Section 4.2.3 the considered range of KR was
increased to K¯R = 1.6.
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Figure 2: Optimal investment functions in mode m1
Quite a different picture emerges if we consider R&D investment. Figure 2(b)
shows the function IR exhibits a substantial downward jump along a large part of the
Skiba curve if the initial state is moved from the basin of attraction of the steady state
with positive knowledge stock into the basin of attraction of the zero knowledge steady
state. It can also be seen that close to the Skiba curve R&D investment is positive even
in the basin of attraction of the zero knowledge steady state. For a considerable part
of the state space optimal R&D investment is zero. In those areas where investment
is positive it decreases with the established product capacity. This is because the
higher the established product capacity the lower the output price of the innovative
product. Moreover, introducing the innovative product on the market results in a
larger reduction of established product revenue the higher the established product
capacity is. Second, we see that R&D investment non-monotonically depends on the
knowledge stock, where R&D investment is especially large for intermediate levels of
knowledge. Two countervailing effects are responsible for this non-monotonicity. First,
since the hazard rate is a convex function of the knowledge stock, the marginal effect
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Figure 3: Optimal dynamics in modem1 and basins of attraction of the two long-run
steady states
of an increase of the knowledge stock on the hazard rate becomes larger the larger
the hazard rate already is. This leads to an increase of investment incentives as the
knowledge stock increases. Second, if KR is large the hazard rate is already large,
implying that the expected waiting time of innovation is small. Since the marginal
return to R&D investments are zero in mode m2 this reduces incentives for R&D
investments. As can be seen in Figure 2(b) the first of these two effects dominates
in the basin of attraction of the zero investment steady state- leading to a positive
dependence of IR fromKR, whereas the second effect is stronger in the part of the state
space where optimal trajectories converge to the steady state with positive knowledge
stock.
4.2.2 Three Innovator Scenarios
Figure 3 shows the vector field of the state-dynamics under optimal firm behavior,
where the co-existing stable steady states and the Skiba curve separating their basins
are indicated by black dots and a black line respectively. The jump in the optimal
control along the Skiba curve, which influences the state-dynamics, can be clearly seen.
To highlight the dependence of the qualitative characteristics of optimal trajectories
from initial conditions three trajectories are highlighted. For all three trajectories the
initial knowledge stock is given by KiniR = 0.6. Those three trajectories represent three
qualitatively different scenarios, which we now discuss.
Dedicated Innovator Scenario
The green trajectory results when the initial established product capacity level is small
(Kini1 = 0.3). Then the firm invests to increase both established product capital and
knowledge. Initially, investments are so large that instantaneous profits are negative
in the beginning of the trajectory, as shown in Figure 4(b). When the established
product capacity is low, the price of the established product is high, which explains
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why the firm wants to grow in the established product market. The firm is also eager
to innovate as long as the established product sales are low, because, first, introducing
the innovative product on the market does not lead to a large reduction of established
product revenue, and, second, a low established product capacity implies that the
output price for the innovative product is high. The firm converges to a steady state
where both established product capacity and the knowledge stock are positive. Note
that it is beforehand not known up to which point in time this trajectory is realized
because of the positive innovation probability for all t.
For the considered parameter setting R&D costs in mode m1 stay at such a high
level that the firm makes losses for its entire time in mode m1. As soon as the break-
through in the innovation project is realized, the firm starts investing in innovative
product capacity, and, at the same time strongly reduces its investment in the capacity
for the old product. Technically speaking, mode m1 passes into mode m2. Inspection
of the investment trajectories (not shown here) reveals that the firm scraps parts of
its old market capacity (i.e. I1 < 0) directly after the innovation has been introduced.
Also the firm of course stops investing in new knowledge. The reduction of I1 and IR
outweighs the costs of the buildup of capacity for the new product and instantaneous
profits jump up at the point in time when mode m2 is entered and keeps increasing
from that point on. Figure 4(a) shows that the probability of innovation is especially
large in the beginning, that is when R&D investments are at the highest level (cf.
Figure 2(b)). The cumulative probability that the firm eventually innovates is equal
to one here, as is confirmed in Figure 5, which shows how the cumulative innovation
probability depends on the initial level of K1 and in and Figure 6(a), where the dis-
tribution of innovation times for the initial condition Kini1 = 0.3 is shown. The mean
innovation time is IE[T ] = 2.61 and the probability that the jump to mode m2 occurs
before t = 15 is more than 99%. Summarizing, we observe that if the firm has a
relatively small established product capacity and a sufficiently large knowledge stock
when the innovation option becomes available (i.e. t = 0), it is dedicated to pursue the
innovation project till completion regardless of the actual innovation time. It should
be noted that even with small established product capacity a certain initial knowledge
stock is necessary to become a dedicated innovator. In particular for a small firm which
is new to the market, and therefore has not built up sufficient knowledge, a dedicated
R&D investment strategy is not optimal. Hence, our model provides a theoretical
foundation for recent empirical observations by Dolfsma and Van der Velde (2014).
No Innovator Scenario
The blue trajectory corresponds to a scenario where the initial established product
capacity level is large (Kini1 = 0.55). The innovation incentive is low now due to the
cannibalization effect: introducing the innovative product on the market would reduce
the price of the established product, which decreases revenue due to the large sales
level. For this reason the firm does not invest in R&D at any time here. Due to the
initial positive knowledge stock the hazard rate is initially positive but very small. It
decreases over time to zero (see also Figure 4(a) and Figure 5). Consequently, the cu-
mulative innovation probability of the firm is very small and with a probability close to
one the firm stays in mode m1 and converges to a steady state without any knowledge
18
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
t
λ
(a)
1 2 3 4 5 6
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.2
t
F
(b)
Figure 4: Dynamics of (a) the hazard rate in mode m1 and (b) instantaneous profits
for different initial conditions. The assumed realization of the innovation time in
panel (b) for Kini1 = 0.3 (green line) is T = 2.9 and for Kini1 = 0.32 (red line) is
T = 0.7. For Kini1 = 0.55 (blue line) it is assumed that no innovation occurs.
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Figure 5: Probability that new product is introduced for KR(0) = 0.6.
and a positive established product capacity level being denoted by K∗,31 . Due to the
missing investments in knowledge and the small investments in capacity for the es-
tablished market the instantaneous profits are positive throughout the whole planning
period. However, the long run instantaneous profits stay below the level of that of the
successful innovator (compare the green and blue lines in Figure 4(a)). In this sense
having a strong initial position on the established market has a negative impact on
the instantaneous profits of the firm in the long run. Due to the discounting the value
function is however larger for K1(0) = 0.55 (blue trajectory) compared to K1(0) = 0.3
(green trajectory).
Temporary Innovator Scenario
The red trajectory arises when the initial established product capacity level is of inter-
mediate size (Kini1 = 0.32). Initially the firm grows on the established product market
while it invests in R&D to increase knowledge. The initial investment outlays are
such that the instantaneous profits are negative (see Figure 4(b)). However, at some
point established product sales have become so large that the firm no longer wants
to pursue innovation. Consequently, the firm stops investing in R&D and the trajec-
tory converges to a steady state with established production capacity being equal to
K∗,31 and zero knowledge stock. As discussed in the previous paragraph, the instanta-
neous payoff at this steady state is positive. Along the trajectory it can happen that
the innovation breakthrough takes place and the firm starts producing the innovative
product. From Figure 4(a) we obtain that this probability especially is positive at the
beginning of the planning period, i.e. when the firm actively invests in R&D. But, as
can be derived from Figures 5 and 6(b), the cumulative probability that the innova-
tion breakthrough eventually happens is substantially less than one. Intuitively, the
temporary innovator gives the innovation a chance while it is still relatively small on
the established market, but then abandons the innovation project once it has built
up sufficient capacity for the established product. This interpretation is confirmed by
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Figure 6: Distribution of innovation times for (a) K1(0) = 0.3 and (b) K1(0) = 0.32
with KR(0) = 0.6.
considering the distribution of the innovation time under optimal firm behavior for this
initial condition. Whereas the probability of a finite innovation time is less than 10%,
the expected innovation time conditional on being finite is given by IET<∞[T ] = 1.33,
which is only about half the expected innovation time of the dedicated innovator.
Whereas in the parameter setting considered here increasing the capacity for the
established product induces a downward jump of the innovation probability, this prob-
ability remains positive, although small. In case the Skiba curve intersects with the
KR = 0 line increasing the initial value of K1 can induce a transition from a case where
mode m2 is reached with probability 1 to a case where the second mode is reached
with probability zero. In Appendix A.5 we demonstrate that such a case occurs in
our model for a value of µR = 0.975, which is slightly smaller than our default value.
Assuming that the firm has no initial knowledge (i.e. KiniR = 0) then implies that for
Kini1 = 0.1 the innovation is introduced with probability 1, whereas for Kini1 = 0.2
investment in R&D and the hazard rate are constant zero along the optimal trajectory
such that the firm stays in m1 without innovation for sure.
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Figure 7: Phase diagram under welfare maximizing investment policies
4.2.3 Welfare Analysis
The observation, that for a certain subset of initial conditions the monopolist refrains
from R&D investment and thereby reduces the probability of product innovation vir-
tually to zero, raises the question whether such a ’non-innovation strategy’ is also
desirable from a welfare perspective. In order to address this question we characterize
the welfare maximizing investment strategies. In particular, we consider an analogous
dynamic optimization problem with two modes to that of the monopolist given in (10),
where the instantaneous objective function has been replaced by the welfare function4
and the objective now reads
J(I1, I2, IR) = EPm
{∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[
K1 + (1 + θ)K2 − 12
(
K21 +K22
)
− ηK1K2
−µ1I1 − γ12 I
2
1 − µ2I2 −
γ2
2 I
2
2 − µRIR −
γR
2 I
2
R
]
dt
}
(33)
Using the numerical methods lined out above we obtain the value function and
the corresponding welfare maximizing investment functions for physical capital and
knowledge. Inserting these investment functions into the state dynamics in mode m1
yields for our default parameter constellation the phase diagram shown in Figure 7.
Comparing this figure with Figure 3, where the phase diagram under optimal in-
vestment of the firm is shown, clearly indicates that for all initial conditions giving
rise to the No-Innovator or Temporary Innovator scenario, optimal firm behavior in-
duces (with positive probability) a long run outcome qualitatively different from the
welfare maximizing one. For all initial values of the firm’s capacity for the established
product and knowledge stock, under the welfare maximizing investment strategy a
positive knowledge stock is built in the long run, which implies that the new prod-
uct is introduced with probability one. The long run hazard rate under the efficient
4It should be noted that the linear inverse demand can be derived from a quadratic utility
function of a representative consumer. The welfare function is given by the difference between
this utility function and investment costs (note that production costs are set to zero), which is
equivalent to the sum of consumer and producer surplus.
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path is also higher than the hazard rate in the Dedicated Innovator scenario. The
intuition for this observation is straight forward. The firm does not take into account
the additional consumer surplus that is generated due to the introduction of the new
product. Hence, its incentives to invest in knowledge generation are below the efficient
level. Furthermore, as has to be expected, also the incentives for the firm to invest in
physical capital are below the efficient level.
4.3 Effects of Product Differentiation on Innovation and In-
vestment
Having discussed the dependence of the optimal behavior of the firm from the initial
values of the state variables K1 and KR we now explore how optimal behavior depends
on key parameters of the model. In particular, we are interested in the effects of
changes of the degree of vertical and horizontal differentiation on the R&D activities
and physical capacity investments prior to the innovation. To keep this analysis as
transparent as possible we concentrate on the effects of the differentiation parameters
on the steady state values of the established product capacityK1 and the hazard rate λ
in the positive innovation steady state of modem1. It is evident that the differentiation
parameters have no influence on the (locally) stable steady state on the KR = 0 line,
since in this steady state the new product is never introduced.
In Figure 8(a) we see that the steady-state level of the capacity of the established
product depends non-monotonously on the parameter η, which governs the degree of
horizontal differentiation. In particular, for values of η close to 1, i.e. in cases where
the new product is only weakly horizontally differentiated, an increase of η implies
an increase of the capacity of the established product. At first sight this is quite
counter-intuitive, since one might expect that the closer the new product is to the
established one the larger is the expected cannibalization between the two products
and the smaller should the capacity for the established product be. For an exogenous
hazard rate this reasoning would be correct, but in our setting with endogenous hazard
rate an additional effect has to be considered. As can be seen in Figure 8(b) the hazard
rate decreases substantially if η moves closer to 1. Incentives to invest in R&D are
lower the closer the new product is to the established one. The decrease in the hazard
rate implies that the expected waiting time till the arrival of the new product increases
and this has a positive effect on the incentives to invest in capacity for the established
product. For large values of η this second effect dominates and the hence there is
a positive relationship between η and the steady state capacity of the established
product.
Considering the effect of the degree of vertical differentiation no such tradeoff arises.
As the parameter θ capturing the degree of vertical differentiation increases the hazard
rate goes up (see Figure 9 (b) ) and hence the expected time till innovation becomes
smaller. This decreases incentives to invest in K1. Furthermore, if the quality of the
new product becomes larger then this negatively affects the demand for the established
product after the innovation, which also reduced incentives to invest in capacity for
this product. Therefore, an increase in the degree of vertical differentiation always
leads to lower investment in established product capacity.
We have carried out extensive additional sensitivity checks for other model pa-
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Figure 8: Steady state level of physical capital (a) and hazard rate (b) in mode m1
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rameters in order to ensure the robustness of our findings, but since these analyses
generated economically very intuitive results we abstain from presenting them here in
detail.
5 Conclusions
To our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to analyze in a fully dynamic frame-
work the incentives of an established incumbent to engage in a risky R&D project with
the aim to extend its own product range. Using an innovative numerical method we
identify three distinctive scenarios depending on the initial levels of the established
product capacity and the knowledge stock. Of specific interest is the insight that there
arises a hysteresis effect in a sense that the initial conditions crucially determine the
probability that the innovation takes place, even if an infinite time horizon is consid-
ered. A noteworthy implication of our analysis is that starting a product innovation
project and terminating it after a relatively short period of time can be optimal from
the firm perspective. This insight is especially remarkable since we abstract from
competition in the current setting, which implies that the termination of the project
is not triggered by the success of an innovating competitor. Rather it is driven by
the interaction of the growth of the established product capacity with the stochastic
nature of the R&D project. Our welfare analysis indicates that there is scope for policy
intervention with the aim to stimulate investment in the risky R&D project.
An extension of this endogenous innovation framework to a duopoly model is the
next step. It will be interesting to explore how the effects identified in this paper
interact with strategic considerations arising in a duopoly setup.
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A Appendix
A.1 Location and Stability of the Steady State in Mode m2:
The expression of the Hamiltonian in mode m2 is:
Hm2(K1, K2, I1, I2, u1,m2 , u2) = K1(1−K1 − ηK2) +K2(1 + θ − ηK1 −K2)
− µ1I1 − 12γ1I
2
1 − µ2I2 −
1
2γ2I
2
2
+ u1,m2(I1 − δ1K1) + u2,m2(I2 − δ2K2)
where u1,m2 and u2,m2 are respectively the costate variabes associated with the dy-
namic constraints on K1 and K2.
First order conditions for the optimization of the Hamiltonian are:
∂H(m2)
∂K1
= u1,m2 =⇒ ˙u1,m2 − (r + δ1)u1,m2 = 2K1 + 2ηK2 − 1 (34)
∂Hm2
∂K2
= u2,m2 =⇒ ˙u2,m2 − (r + δ2)u2,m2 = 2K2 + 2ηK1 − (1 + θ) (35)
∂Hm2
∂I1
= 0 =⇒ −µ1 − γ1I1 + u1,m2 = 0 (36)
∂Hm2
∂I2
= 0 =⇒ −µ2 − γ2I2 + u2,m2 = 0 (37)
∂Hm2
∂u1,m2
= 0 =⇒ I1 − δ1K1 = K˙1 (38)
∂Hm2
∂u2,m2
= 0 =⇒ I2 − δ2K2 = K˙2 (39)
We assume that (I1, I2) is a (piecewise) continuously differentiable function. Solving
for I1 and I2 in (36) and (37) and substituting in (38) and (39) yields:
I1 = 1γ1 (u1,m2 − µ1) I2 = 1γ2 (u2,m2 − µ2)
With further substitution, one gets the canonical system
K˙1 = −δ1K1 + 1γ1 (u1,m2 − µ1)
K˙2 = −δ2K2 + 1γ2 (u2,m2 − µ2)
u˙1,m2 = (r + δ1)u1,m2 + 2K1 + 2ηK2 − 1
u˙2,m2 = (r + δ2)u2,m2 + 2ηK1 + 2K2 − (1 + θ)
(40)
Direct calculations show that there is a unique fixed point of this system given by
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Kss1 =
(1− (r + δ1)µ1)(2 + (r + δ2)γ2δ2)− 2η(1 + θ − (r + δ2)µ2)
(δ2γ2(r + δ2) + 2)(δ1γ1(r + δ1) + 2)− 4η2
Kss2 =
(1 + θ − (r + δ2)µ2)(2 + (r + δ1)γ1δ1)− 2η(1− (r + δ1)µ1)
(δ2γ2(r + δ2) + 2)(δ1γ1(r + δ1) + 2)− 4η2
uss1,m2 =
2Kss1 + 2ηKss2 − 1
r + δ1
uss2,m2 =
2ηKss1 + 2Kss2 − (1 + θ)
r + δ2
.
Concerning stability of the steady state, Grass et al. (2008) provide necessary and
sufficient conditions that the stable manifold around the steady state has dimension
2, which corresponds to an asymptotically stable steady state in the state-space. De-
noting by J the Jacobian of the dynamics at the steady-state and defining K as
K =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂
·
K1
∂K1
∂
·
K1
∂u1
∂
·
u1
∂K1
∂
·
u1
∂u1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂
·
K2
∂K2
∂
·
K2
∂u2
∂
·
u2
∂K2
∂
·
u2
∂u2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣+ 2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂
·
K1
∂K2
∂
·
K1
∂u2
∂
·
u1
∂K2
∂
·
u1
∂u2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
the conditions in Grass et al. (2008) (page 345) read
K < 0
0 < detJ < (K2 )
2.
(41)
For our model we obtain
K =
∣∣∣∣∣ −δ1
1
γ1
2 r + δ1
∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣ −δ2
1
γ2
2 r + δ2
∣∣∣∣∣+ 2
∣∣∣∣∣ 0 02η 0
∣∣∣∣∣
= −2
γ1
+ −2
γ2
− δ1(r + δ1)− δ2(r + δ2)
and
det J =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−δ1 0 1γ1 0
0 −δ2 0 1γ2
2 2η r + δ1 0
2η 2 0 r + δ2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
(
2
γ1
+ δ1(r + δ1)
)(
2
γ2
+ δ2(r + δ2)
)
− 4η
2
γ1γ2
Hence, conditions (41) reduce to:
4η2
γ1γ2
<
(
2
γ1
+ δ1(r + δ1)
)(
2
γ2
+ δ2(r + δ2)
)
Taking into account η < 1 as well as δi > 0, r > 0 shows that this condition is
always satsified, which implies that under our assumption the unique steady state is
stable.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The general form of the value function depend on the mode m of the system. The
value function is of the form V (K1, KR,m) = V(m1) in mode m1 (because K2 = 0 in
mode m1) and V (K1, K2,m) = V(m2) in mode m2 (because KR is irrelevant in mode
m2).
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation can be written as follows in mode m2:
rV(m2) = max
I1, I2
[
K1(1−K1 − ηK2) +K2(1 + θ − ηK1 −K2)− µ1I1 − 12γ1I1
2
+∂V(m2)
∂K1
(I1 − δ1K1)− µ2I2 − 12γ2I2
2 + ∂V(m2)
∂K2
(I2 − δ2K2)
]
(42)
First order conditions for optimal investment levels are :
I1 =
1
γ1
(
∂V(m2)
∂K1
− µ1
)
I2 =
1
γ2
(
∂V(m2)
∂K2
− µ2
)
(43)
Relations (42) and (43) work out to yield:
rV(m2) =
(
−µ1
γ1
− δ1K1
)
∂V(m2)
∂K1
+ 12γ1
(
∂V(m2)
∂K1
)2
+
(
−µ2
γ2
− δ2K2
)
∂V(m2)
∂K2
+ 12γ2
(
∂V(m2)
∂K2
)2
+ 12
µ21
γ1
+ 12
µ22
γ2
+K1 (1−K1 − ηK2) +K2 (1 + θ −K2 − ηK1) (44)
Owing to the quadratic form of the objective function and the linear form of the
state dynamics, we postulate a linear quadratic form for the value function V(m2):
V(m2) = aK21 + bK1 + dK1K2 + eK22 + fK2 + g
When this functional form is plugged back into (44), one gets by comparison of coef-
ficients the following system:
ra = 2
γ1
a2 + 12γ2d
2 − 2aδ1 − 1
re = 2
γ2
e2 + 12γ1d
2 − 2eδ2 − 1
rd = 2
γ1
ad+ 2
γ2
ed− d(δ1 + δ2)− 2η
rb = 2
γ1
a(b− µ1) + 1γ2d(f − µ2)− δ1b+ 1
rf = 2
γ2
e(f − µ2) + 1γ1d(b− µ1)− δ2f + θ + 1
rg = 12γ1 b
2 + 12γ2f
2 − µ1
γ1
b− µ2
γ2
f + 12γ1µ
2
1 + 12γ2µ
2
2
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A.3 Transformation of Lagrangian and Derivation of Co-State
Equations
Using standard control theory the Lagrangian of the optimal control problem to solve
is:
Rewriting the objective function we obtain
J = E
{∫ T
0
e−rt[K1p1 − C1(I1)− CR(IR))]dt+ e−rTV(m2)(K1(T ), K2(T ))
}
=
∫ ∞
0
e−rtIP(m(t) = m1)
[
K1p1 − C1(I1)− CRIR)] + λ(t)V(m2)(K1, 0)
]
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−rte−z
[
K1p1 − C1(I1)− CR(IR))] + λ(t)V(m2)(K1, 0)
]
The corresponding current value Hamiltonian has the following expression:
H(K1, KR, z, u˜1, u˜R, u˜z) = e−z
[
K1(1−K1)− µ1I1 − 12γ1I
2
1 − µRIR −
1
2γRI
2
R
+(αIR + βKψR)V(m2)(K1, 0)
]
+ u˜1(I1 − δ1K1)
+ u˜R(IR − δRKR) + u˜z(αIR + βKψR)
where u˜1 and u˜R are respectively the costate variabes associated with the dynamic
constraints on K1 and KR, and u˜z the costate associated with the auxiliary variable z.
The corresponding Lagrangian reads
L(K1, KR, z, u˜1, u˜R, u˜z, ω˜K1 , ωIR) = e−z
[
K1(1−K1)− µ1I1 − 12γ1I
2
1 − µRIR −
1
2γRI
2
R
+(αIR + βKψR)V(m2)(K1, 0)
]
+ u˜1(I1 − δ1K1) + u˜R(IR − δRKR) + u˜z(αIR + βKψR)
+ ω˜K1K1 + ω˜IRIR
and after the transformations ui = ezu˜i, i ∈ {1, R, z} and ωi = ezω˜i, i ∈ {K1, IR}
we obtain the transformed Lagrangian given in (18).
First order conditions imply:
∂L
∂I1
= −µ1e−z − γ1I1e−z + u˜1 = 0 (45)
⇒ I1= u˜1 − µ1e
−z
γ1e−z
= u1 − µ1
γ1
∂L
∂IR
= −µRe−z − γRIRe−z + αV(m2)e−z + u˜R + αu˜z + ω˜IR = 0 (46)
⇒ IR= u˜R + αu˜z + ω˜IR − µRe
−z + αV(m2)e−z
γRe−z
= uR + αuz + ωIR − µR + αV(m2)
γR
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
u˜1 = ru˜1 − ∂L
∂K1

u˜R = ru˜R − ∂L
∂KR

u˜z = ru˜z − ∂L
∂z
Note that

u1 =

u˜1e
z + u˜1ez z˙
=

u˜1e
z + u˜1ez(αIR + βKψR),
so that we obtain for the first co-state equation

u1 = (ru˜1 − ∂L
∂K1
)ez + u˜1ez(αIR + βKψR)
= ru1 − (1− 2K1) + δ1u˜1ez − (αIR + βKψR)
∂V(m2)(K1, 0)
∂K1
− ω˜K1ez + u1(αIR + βKψR)
= (r + δ1 + αIR + βKψR)u1 − (1− 2K1)− (αIR + βKψR)
∂V(m2)(K1, 0)
∂K1
− ωK1
Likewise,

uR =

u˜Re
z + u˜Rez(αIR + βKψR),
so that

uR =
(
ru˜R − ∂L
∂KR
)
ez + uR(αIR + βKψR)
= ruR − βψKψ−1R V(m2)(K1, 0) + δRu˜Rez − ψβKψ−1R u˜zez + uR(αIR + βKψR)
= (r + δR + αIR + βKψR)uR − ψβKψ−1R (V(m2)(K1, 0) + uz)
And, analogously

uz = (ru˜z − ∂L
∂z
)ez + uz(αIR + βKψR)
= ruz + e−z
[
K1(1−K1)− µ1 − 12γ1I
2
1 − µR −
1
2γRI
2
R + (αIR + βK
ψ
R)V(m2)(K1, 0)
]
ez
+ uz(αIR + βKψR)
= ruz +K1(1−K1)− µ1 − 12γ1I
2
1 − µR −
1
2γRI
2
R + (αIR + βK
ψ
R)V(m2)(K1, 0)
+ uz(αIR + βKψR)
= (r + αIR + βKψR)uz +K1(1−K1)− µ1 −
1
2γ1I
2
1 − µR −
1
2γRI
2
R
+ (αIR + βKψR)V(m2)(K1, 0)
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
In order to characterize the properties of the steady state, we study the Jacobian of
the system of state-costate equations in (K1, KR, z, u1, uR, uz):
K˙1 = −δ1K1 + I1
K˙R = −δRKR + IR
·
z = αIR + βKψR
u˙1 = (r + δ1 + αIR + βKψR)u1 − (1− 2K1)− (αIR + βKψR)
(
∂V(m2)(K1, 0)
∂K1
)
u˙R = (r + δR + αIR + βKψR)uR − βψKψ−1R (V(m2)(K1, 0) + uz)
u˙z = (r + αIR + βKψR)uz +K1(1−K1)− µ1I1 −
1
2γ1I
2
1
− µRIR − 12γRI
2
R + (αIR + βK
ψ
R)V(m2)(K1, 0),
where I1, I1,and V(m2)(K1, 0) are replaced, as needed, by their respective expressions
given by (19),(20) and (16). Given that there are three co-state equations in this system
standard arguments show that a stable steady state requires three eigenvalues with
positive real parts. Furthermore, given that we need two state variables to converge
to the steady state (remember that z does not converge in mode m1) we also need
two eigenvalues with negative real parts. In what follows we show that the eigenvalues
have these signs if and only if the conditions given in the Proposition hold.
Denote V1 =
∂V(m2)(K1,0)
∂K1
= 2aK1 + b
Y = uR (V + uz)−1 +K−1R (1− ψ)
Z = (u1 − V1)
R = r + λ
X = βψKψ−1R
F = K1(1−K1)− µ1I1 − 12γ1I21 − µRIR − 12γRI2R
F1 = ∂F∂K1 = 1− 2K1
J =

−δ1 0 0 1γ1 0 0
α
γR
V1 −δR 0 0 1γR αγR
α2
γR
V1 X 0 0 αγR
α2
γR
2− 2aλ+ α2
γR
V1Z XZ 0 R + δ1 αγRZ
α2
γR
Z
α2
γR
(uR −X)V1 X (V + uz)Y 0 0 R + δR+ α
γR
uR
α2
γR
uR
−X
1− 2K1
+αV1(λ− uRγR )
X (V + uz) 0 −u1γ1 − 1γRuR R− αγRuR

The characteristic polynomial P (ξ) = |J − ξ1I 6|, where 1I denotes the identity
matrix, is the following determinant:
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P (ξ) =

−δ1 − ξ 0 0 1γ1 0 0
α
γR
V1 −δR − ξ 0 0 1γR αγR
α2
γR
V1 X −ξ 0 αγR α
2
γR
2− 2aλ+ α2
γR
V1Z XZ 0 R + δ1 − ξ αγRZ α
2
γR
Z
α2
γR
(uR −X)V1 X (V + uz)Y 0 0 R + δR+ α
γR
uR − ξ
α2
γR
uR
−X
1− 2K1
+αV1(λ− uRγR )
X (V + uz) 0 −u1γ1 − 1γRuR
R− α
γR
uR
−ξ

After subtracting α times the fifth column from the sixth column and given that the
third column is all zeros except for −ξ, the characteristic polynomial can be rewritten
as
P (ξ) = −ξ(R− ξ)J1 + ξ(αξ −Rα− αδR −X)J2
with
J1 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−δ1 − ξ 0 1γ1 0
α
γR
V1 −δR − ξ 0 1γR
2− 2aλ+ α2
γR
V1Z XZ R + δ1 − ξ αγRZ
α2
γR
(uR −X)V1 X (V + uz)Y 0 R + δR + αγRuR − ξ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
and
J2 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−δ1 − ξ 0 1γ1 0
α
γR
V1 −δR − ξ 0 1γR
2− 2aλ+ α2
γR
V1Z XZ R + δ1 − ξ αγRZ
F1 + V1(λ− uRγR ) X (V + uz) −u1γ1 − 1γRuR.
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
This implies that ξ = 0 is a root of the characteristic equation. For the further
determination of stability this eigenvalue can be left aside since it corresponds to the
artificial state z(t). Recall the following relations that define the steady-state:
I1 = δ1K1
IR = δRKR
F1 = (R + δ1)u1 − λV1
βψKψ−1R (V + uz) = (R + δR)uR
−Ruz = F + (R− r)V
Then:
X (V + uz) = (R + δR)uR and F1 + λV1 = (R + δ1)u1
so that
J2 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−δ1 − ξ 0 1γ1 0
α
γR
V1 −δR − ξ 0 1γR
2− 2aλ+ α2
γR
V1Z XZ R + δ1 − ξ αγRZ
(R + δ1)u1 − αuRγR (R + δR)uR −u1γ1 − 1γRuR
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
After some lengthy calculations one gets:
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J2 = 1γR (R−ξ)
[
−uR(−δ1 − ξ)(R + δ1 − ξ) + 1γ1uR(2− 2aλ) + 1γ1u1Z(α(−δR − ξ)−X)
]
Now,
J1 =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−δ1 − ξ 0 1γ1 0
α
γR
V1 −δR − ξ 0 1γR
2− 2aλ+ α2
γR
V1Z XZ R + δ1 − ξ αγRZ
(α2
γR
uR −X)V1 (R + δR)uRY 0 R + δR + αγRuR − ξ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
and after similar calculations one obtains:
J1 = (−δ1 − ξ)(R + δ1 − ξ)
[
(−δR − ξ)(R + δR + αγRuR − ξ)− 1γR (R + δR)uRY
]
+ 1
γ1
(2− 2a(R− r))
[
1
γR
(R + δR)uRY − (R + δR + αγRuR − ξ)(−δR − ξ)
]
+ 1
γ1
1
γR
V1Z(X − α(−δR − ξ))(α(R + δR − ξ) +X)
Finally,
P (ξ) = −ξ(R− ξ)
[
(−δ1 − ξ) (R + δ1 − ξ)
[
(−δR − ξ)(R + δR + α
γR
uR − ξ)− 1
γR
(R + δR)uRY
]
+ 1
γ1
(2− 2aλ)
(
1
γR
(R + δR)uRY − (−δR − ξ)(R + δR + α
γR
uR − ξ)
)
+ 1
γ1
1
γR
V1Z(X − α(−δR − ξ))(α(R + δR − ξ) +X)
− (αξ −Rα− αδR −X) 1
γR
[
−uR(−δ1 − ξ)(R + δ1 − ξ)
+ 1
γ1
uR(2− 2a(R− r)) + 1
γ1
u1Z(α(−δR − ξ)−X)
]]
.
This implies that one eigenvalue is given by ξ5 = R. The remaining four eigenvalues
are given by the roots of the term in the largest brackets, which is a polynomial of
degree four in ξ:
ξ4 − 2Rξ3 +M2ξ2 −M3ξ +Q,
where
M2 = α2
1
γ1
1
γR
(u1 − V1)2 − 1
γ1
(2− 2a(R− r)) + 1
γR
(R + δR)uR(uR (V + uz)−1 +K−1(1− ψ))
+Rδ1 +RδR −R2 + δ21 + δ2R +
α
γR
uR(R + 2δR) + βψ
uR
γR
Kψ−1R ,
Q = − 1
γ1
1
γR
(u1 − V1)2(βψKψ−1R + αδR +Rα)(βψKψ−1R + αδR)
+
[
δ1(R + δ1)
+ 1
γ1
(2− 2a(R− r))
]  1γR (R + δR)uR(uR (V + uz)−1 +K−1(1− ψ))
+((R + δR)δR + 1γRuR(βψK
ψ−1
R +Rα + 2αδR))

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and
M3 = RM2 −R3. (47)
Denote
M = M2 −R2, (48)
then the quartic equation
ξ4 − 2Rξ3 +M2ξ2 −M3ξ +Q = 0
is equivalent to
p4 +
(
M − 12R
2
)
p2 +Q+ 116R
4 − 14MR
2 = 0
by virtue of the change of variable p = ξ − R2 and by taking into account the above
relations (47) and (48) among M , M2 and M3.
It follows that the four roots of the quartic equation in ξ are
ξ1,2,3,4 =
R
2 ±
1
2
√
R2 − 2M ± 2
√
M2 − 4Q.
Since IR is constrained to be non-negative, ξ5 = R = r + αIR + βKψR is positive and
real. To obtain a stable steady state, one needs two of the other four eigenvalues to
have positive real parts and the remaining two to have negative real parts. Following
arguments analagous to those in Dockner (1985) and Dockner and Feichtinger (1991)
it is straight-forward to conclude that two of the eigenvalues Ξ1,2,3,4 have positive and
two have negative real part if and only if
M < 0
and
0 < Q ≤ M
2
4 .
This concludes the proof.
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A.5 The Case With µR = 0.975
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Figure 10: Optimal investment functions in mode m1 for µR = 0.975.
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Figure 11: Optimal dynamics in mode m1 and basins of attraction of the two long-
run steady state for µR = 0.975 and the initial conditions (Kini1 , KiniR ) = (0.1, 0)
(green line) and (Kini1 , KiniR ) = (0.2, 0) (blue line).
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